The danger of arguing the pragmatic against the principled is that pragmatism always depends upon fallible human prognostication: it’s a gamble. Sometimes things break with the odds as the pragmatic sees them. Sometimes not. A lot can depend on knowing enough up front. Only hindsight can be 20-20, though even with hindsight the human tendency to rewrite history to favor whoever has the power to do so–and thus fake a better outcome than truly exists–is always a problem as well… *sigh*
The problem with choosing principles over pragmatism is even more complicated. First, in today’s society where often principles are argued against simply because they are about right and wrong and post-rational post modernism sees “right and wrong” as meaningless–except where “principles” of post-rational post modern are concerned, of course–simply asserting principles exist can be dangerous for the asserter. The minefield of such meaningless stances as “Right to Choose”–which means the right to deny a child the right to choose whether it wantsd to be born or not–is fraught with peril.
And that’s just the fetid grounding of today’s social setting. Political? Simply defending principles such as freedom of political speech by citizens in the face of McCain-Feingold* is literally dangerous to a citizen’s continued existence outside of iron bars.
Nevertheless, sometimes it’s profitable to at least ask, “Is what we’ll gain by this pragmatic decision–even if it works as planned–worth what it will cost us in the long run?”
Now, that sounds rather like meta-pragmatism, doesn’t it? *heh* Well, that’s how principles work.
Specifics:
Wall Street/banking bailout.
Short term gain: stabilize the economy.
Medium-term gain: the “feddle gummint” could reap over $2Trillion on the “investment” of $700Billion. (Yeh, read Andy Kessler’s WSJ article at the link. He could be right about the medium-term outcomes.) Now, if (BIG “IF”!) that potential gain were to actualize and be applied only toward federal debt or even to set up an inviolate Social Security fund, untouchable for expenditures apart from retirement payments to those who’ve paid into the system, I’d not be as concerned about
Long-term loss: free markets. Bailouts of those who supporedt alien invaders with junk loans. Greedy, avaricious, thieves who profitted from losses they caused with their bad management of other people’s money (and yes, that specifically includes all the politicians who actively pressured lenders to throw bad money after good in mortgages to people who could not pay for them).
Since any “profits” that the federal government coffers might gain from the bailout will, if history is any guide at all, simply be wasted on more unconstitutional spending rather than be used for commonsense things like reducing the debt load, that leaves only the short-term gains to balance the long-term losses to a free market.
Even a pragmatic person might see that violating principle here could be too costly, no?
Addendum: Maybe we could push for an amendment to the Constitution requiring a personal response to “I, Pencil” from every “feddle gummint” bureaucrap and elected official before allowing them to suck at the public teat. Perhaps then we’d be able to weed a few out who have less understanding of free market principles than a head of cabbage does. Perhaps. (I suspect most would simply crib from a Cliff Notes dumbing down of the already simple little didactic story.)
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Post-rational post-modern? What exactly do you mean by that? Is their even such a thing as post rational? I think you are trying to indicate something closer to moral relativism, a view which most certainly is not held by the majority of Americans today. The numbers of logical fallacies committed in this post are alarming. Denying an un-born child the right to chose? The child is not cable of even having a say, what exactly are you trying to assert; that non existent people have can make choices. Pragmatism dose not in anyway necessarily imply a prediction about the future. It means only that the truth a principle is found in the result of an action not the principle by which ones actions may or may not been guided. ‘Meta-Pragmatism’ is as such a contradiction in terms. All though one thing is clear you have answered my question, it would seem this post in it self is ‘post rational.’
Brett,
(Initial response from a base of caffeine deprivation on top of 50 hours’ sleep deprivation–*heh*) Can you say, “Ignorantia Elenchi”?
“The numbers of logical fallacies committed in this post are alarming.” The numbers of fallacies commited in that one sentence demonstrate the fallacy mentioned above.
Perhaps that’ll get you started. I’ll give you some more help by noting that your statement I quoted embodies at least 2 more specific fallacies (OK, one is a subordinate category to a primary fallacy). I’ll give you an opportunity to
a. note your fallacies in that one sentence and
b. be specific: what fallacies–specifically–do you assert I commited? (Probable response? *crickets chirping*)
c. note the type of piece the post is. Perhaps that can aid you in your search for things you think are fallacies of reasoning.
I’ll wait. Meanwhile, concerning “post rational” you say,
“I think you are trying to indicate something closer to moral relativism, a view which most certainly is not held by the majority of Americans today.”
Well, as Karl Popper famously said (IIRC), it is impossible to speak in such a way that you cannot be misunderstood. Thanks for demonstrating that. May I suggest you simply parse “post rational” in its plain English meaning and look around you?
“Pragmatism dose [sic] not in anyway [sic] necessarily imply a prediction about the future.” Not read much Charles Peirce and William James, eh? (I love James’ assertion of the need for “a little imagination” in philosophy) Of course pragmatism necessarily implies a prediction about the future.
Pragmatism, no matter how it may seek to avoid doing so MUST necessarily be at the very least conditionally predictive (and based on knowlege it cannot have until the experiment is done and results are in–tail eating), and ultimately NONE of the fathers or developers of pragmatism makes any credible assertion of defense of pragmatism absent ANY predictive element. Only post rational post modern pseudo-pragmatists manage that contortion seriously… though still not credibly.
*Arrgghh* “Predictive Veridicality” is a common term, well understood and widely used by some schools of pragmatic thinkers.
The focus on end result is where pragmatism fails because it cannot know truth until ALL results are in, and cannot know all the consequences down the road.
What fun! Pragmatism simply eats its own tail.
Heck, the fundamentally transcendental nature of pragmatism insists on conditions that supercede its own principles. *heh*
And that itself can be another clue to parsing “post rational” if you can think it through.
The reality-based fantasy of pragmatism, inspired at least in large part by Darwin, began as a way to incorporate scientific method into thinking about epistomology. Unfortunately, pragmatists have not been able to falsify the theories of pragmatism in the lab… (any more than Darwin’s fundamental theories have been, but that’s another thing that’s verboten um von zu sprechen, as it were. :-))
Another problem with pragmatism is that ultimate epistemological principles are unavoidable–or at least I’ve yet to read a pragmatic thinker who has managed to avoid them. For the most, of course, the “ultimate epistemological principles” that dominate and undergird their work are almost purely unconscious or unacknowleged preconceptual biases, but that’s another thorny issue best left on the floor.
That’s probably more response than needed–or even helpful, by now–to that point, and certainly its one of the most disjointed responses to such thinking I’ve ever read or heard. *heh*
More–
“Denying an un-born child the right to chose? The child is not cable of even having a say… ”
(Note: thanks for the admission that a fetus is a child. *heh*)
So, “The child is not cable of even having a say…” eh? Nor is a post-birth child of one hour, one minute, one day, week, month, year. If this is your criterion (or even one of your criteria), you have just either impeached your own argument or are laying the groundwork for an argument for infanticide… and euthanasia of anyone considered–or who is in fact–incompetent to “have a say” in whether they want to live or die.
Denying that fact–that your stated criterion applies equally whether the child is pre-born or born–would be dishonest. My assertion is that we ought at least wait until the child has enough information and reasoning ability to make that choice. Child turns 18 (or whenever you might admit they can have a say), ask them, “Do you want to be ‘aborted’?” That at least would be ethically consistent with a genuine pro-choice stance.
Alternatively, 99%+ of women who now choose to abort a child could of course have chosen whether to concieve and thereby have averted the ethical dilemma entirely.
It’s their choice, after all, that created the child. It seems only fair to give the child its own turn before mommy dearest takes another.
Camille Paglia, one of the very few honest suppporters of “unconstrained access to abortion on demand” I have read, admits openly that, “…abortion is murder, the extermination of the powerless by the powerful. Liberals for the most part have shrunk from facing the ethical consequences of their embrace of abortion, which results in the annihilation of concrete individuals and not just clumps of insensate tissue.” This from one of the strongest supporters of abortion on demand–one of its rare few supporters who is honest about her stance.
“The child is not cable of even having a say, [sic] what exactly are you trying to assert; that non existent people have can [sic]make choices.[sic]”
Slow down, Brett. No need to get rattled. First, to satisfy your criterion ( your stated criterion–“not cable of even having a say”), “non-existent people” is an unecessary condition. As I demonstrated, known “existing people” can and do meet that criterion just as easily. Does than make them “not-people”? Is that your criterion for “people”–humans–that they be able to “have a say” as to whether they should be terminated or not?
And so, round about to the tail again: meta-pragmatism is simply being honest about the transcendental nature of pragmatism itself. Admitting the power of all the out of sight events (out of sight in both space and time) over our present–and future and past–observations. An honest pragmatic thinker–like James for example–can indeed learn to step outside the cause-effect structure of simplistic pragmatism (“simplistic pragmatism” certainly cannot be applied to James) and admitting, if only to oneself, that the end of a chosen action, far, far m ore often than not, cannot be known, that all we learn of truth with pragmatic thought and experience is necessarily temporary, partial, fleeting: overtaken by unintended consequences around the corner or too far down the road for us to observe.
(Of course, James is sometimes the pragmatist pragmatists love to hate for his frustrating inconsistent committment to transcendent pragmatism. Dayum, but he knew how to create apparent paradox from darned near nothing. One might almost think he was channeling Kierkegaard at times. Almost. ;-))
And if I don’t get some sleep, I’ll start writing as nonsensically (I already write at least as badly) as James Joyce… (No, he linked content does not mention Joyce by name, but it should have.)
Well you certainly took my brief set comments very seriously? ? Well I must say to begin James is never channeling anything close to Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard having at no time been a pragmatist, other then perhaps having taken on the role briefly in ‘either/or’. Still, your term ‘meta-pragmatism’ seems to be painfully vague in nature and scope. Would James seriously assert that we could step out of the chain of cause and effect and make assertions about our own judgments in such away? It seems that the term ‘meta-pragmatist’ is not really of much use, unless granted you can provide a clear proposition which would be an example of ‘meta-pragmatic’ language. (I am of the opinion that this is most certainly possible, just not shown clearly up to this point.)
I am in complete agreement with you on the fact that the ‘Pro-Choice’ argument is one which is pathetic in structure and depth. I simply was pushing you for a clearer explanation, which you quite kindly provided I must say. I was trying simply to push for a definition of personhood which might provide the base for a strong assertion for or against the rights of the child in question. Potential for life is simply I would find not enough. All though to provide a interesting counter point we need only look to a point made by the late Pope John Paul the second, that “…modern genetic science offers clear confirmation. It has demonstrated that from the first instant there is established programme of what this living being will be a: a person, this individual person with his characteristic aspects already determined.” Can the ‘meta-pragmatism’ you propose provide us with grounding for person hood which is both objectively scientific in nature and subjectively suitable to the unique nature of personhood? I propose this as a question of interest alone, not a criticism.
I find that it would be far too easy for me to simply assert that my original comments where simply my personal musings over a set of terminology I find misleading and some what lacking in purpose. But I must say James is not committed in any way to making predictions about the world. James believes truth is what ever satisfies our experiences as whole. An idea is true in so far as it helps us to find its relation to other parts of experience. James more then anything is attempting, in very good Aristotelian fashion, to over come the classic problem of universals by placing truth objectively within objects as they are not as they are determined by means of rationality. In this way James clearly states time and time again that pragmatics pertains to immediate experiences not necessarily predictions about the future which may require a priori assertions about the uniformity of nature or the laws of induction.
Let see then a example of the plan English meaning of ‘post-rational.’ I hope we both have the same dictionary. ? ‘Post’ seems to mean after the fact or coming after, rational means that which is ‘agreeable to reason’. If this is the case ‘post rational’ is anything coming after that which is agreeable to reason. You of course mean to imply that it means lacking or excluding from reason. Which as such their can be no such example found in the world at our disposal. We are inherently rational beings, any statements or actions we take are based upon some rational assertion. All though it is true that we can be mistaken in our reason and in such behave irrationally we are far more likely to be mistaken in our experiences. This returns us to the pragmatic assertion that truth is simply what we find to be in agreement with the body of our experiences.
You brought several excellent points. Of which I have touched on only a few. I greatly appreciate your time; I enjoy this sort of conversation very much. I hope to hear back in response from you again soon. As such best wishes,
Cheers,
Brett
Brett,
Seriously? I began with noting your lack of seriousness in argument. 🙂 Note my comments policy. Argument is often fun. Unfortunately, you’ver not qualified as a troll, so abandoning argument for ridicule is not an option (ridicule can involve argumentation and good rhetorical tools, but can also–sometimes–be more fun. Oh, well).
Unfortunately, you begin your response here with less than your best:
“Well I must say to begin James is never channeling anything close to Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard having at no time been a pragmatist, other then [sic! not a typo: learn the difference between “then” and “than”!] perhaps having taken on the role briefly in ‘either/or’.”
A suggestion: READ my comment about James where I ended making wry mention of Kierkegaard in aside. Anyone with any actual exposure to James and to Kierkegaard* beyond a survey course can make the connection. I’d leave it as an exercise for the student, but apparently you need far more explicit pointers: The ultimate pragmatist of his day making a plea for “imagination in philosophy” at the very least conjures Kierkegaard’s love of paradox. There’s much more to the connection, of course, as certain of Kierkegaard’s personae embody the practicality of thinking paradoxically (and yes, I know there’s often a vast chasm between “practical” and “pragmatic”). An inability to place apparently disparate viewpoints in conversation with each other reveals either a troubling inflexibility of mind or a lack of enough knowlege to couple with imagination to be able to hear the conversation, and from this brief exposure I wouldn’t assume to know which applies. A clue: James is much more complex and varied in his thought than your comment seems to reveal you believe, and Kierkegaard is more complex and varied than James (or, I find each time I re-read various favs, than I previously thought *heh*).
(OK, a pedantic aside: I have a great deal of trouble reading your prose, though for a vastly different reason than you may legitimately have in reading mine. I’ve been justly accused of obscurantism in the past, though not for a lack of clarity in the actual content, more for nested syntax complexities. A NT Greek prof once accused me of “Pauline sentence construction”–and not in a complimentary way. *heh* Guilty as charged–offering this parenthetical comment as a minor, less complex example. Nevertheless, an observation of your prose: it reveals that you are not widely or well read. Examples: “all though” used for “although,” the previously noted “then/than” error, “their” used for “there” (one is a pronoun and the other is… “exercise for the student”), “some what” (!?!)–no, “somewhat,” and, of course, improper use of or lack of punctuation–“Potential for life is simply I would find not enough” as one of many examples. These sorts of misuses are, I believe, revelatory of a reading list that seems shallow both in quantity and quality. Just an observation. At least you don’t inflict my syntax on a reader. That’s a positive. And perhaps scant and unclear punctuation isn’t the worst sin. *heh* For example, my mixed use and placement of quotation marks suffers from an orthographical amphiboly induced by too much reading of British and Canadian authors, I fear. Enough of pedantic nit picking.)
As to James and his committment to NOT being predictive and assertions that pragmatism only pertains to the “now,” *pshaw* What he says and what he does have led me to long ago note what I later discovered Moskowitz and others had noted independently: James, as every other pragmatist I ever knew who attempted to avoid or denied avoiding being predictive in pragmatic application… did not succeed in doing so. ANd Moskowitz is not alone in assigning “predictive veridictality” to James’ pragmatics. Again, more familiarity with the works, more imagination and looking beyond just the writings to what they actually do as much as what they say would help you here.
Re: “post rational,” you said,
“You of course mean to imply that it means lacking or excluding from reason. Which as such their can be no such example found in the world at our disposal. We are inherently rational beings, any statements or actions we take are based upon some rational assertion.”
*sigh*
Assumes the predicate, “we are rational beings,” which is arguably false. Not necessarily false, but the matter is still unsettled, open to debate.
Stopping here. I’ll wait until you identify “[t]he numbers of logical fallacies committed in [the original] post” before I spend more effort. Seriously, do you think you can make such a completely unsupported assertion (in vulgar parlance a form of “hand waving”) and not be called out? 🙂
Old guy. Past my bedtime. If I continue any longer, I’ll be post rational.
Kierkegaard’s notion of Paradox can not be applied to anything outside the religious. Therefore any assertion that it relates to epistemological concerns is non-sense. You need to re-read Kierkegaard. You are correct I have only a brief understand of James. Although it is clear that imagination is not the question. Although at this point it would seem unclear what the question really is, as you’ve changed the discussion to one of grammar. It is clear you don’t want to answer my questions. It is also clear that you have no grasp of irony, as my original comments where meant to merely reflect the tone and structure of your post. What alarms me the greatest is coming to find you are the type of individual who after going through a lengthy debate which flexed any number of rational means that you would assert that we are not rational beings. But I will submit to your great and expanding intellect and accept that you are clearly not a rational being and move along my humble way.
“Kierkegaard’s notion of Paradox can not [sic] be applied to anything outside the religious. Therefore any assertion that it relates to epistemological concerns is non-sense [sic]. You need to re-read Kierkegaard.”
Oh, dear. You certainly have a profound misunderstanding of the religious, and almost certainly James would disagree with you here. Try reading his “Varieties of Religious Experience” for a glimpse. It’s relatively short, very readable (as James almost invariably is–a better writer than his brother the novelist) and revealing. Perhaps you need to re-read Kierkegaard. He certainly recognized the scope of religious thought.
“You are correct I have only a brief understand [sic] of James.” An aside: Is English not your first language? That might explain some interesting but puzzling holes and gaps.
No.I have not changed the discussion to one of grammar. *sigh* I clearly and unequivocally labeled the comments on your use of English as an aside. Don’t play that game here.
“What alarms me the greatest is coming to find you are the type of individual who after going through a lengthy debate which flexed any number of rational means that you would assert that we are not rational beings.”
False. Either you do not understand plain English or you are being disingenuous here. I clearly said:
“Assumes the predicate, ‘we are rational beings,’ which is arguably false. Not necessarily false, but the matter is still unsettled, open to debate.”
That needs no explanation, no exegesis, no defense. It clearly contradicts your statement that I “assert that we are not rational beings,” and demonstrates that you either do not understand plain English or are simply being disingenuous in your argument.
Which is it?
[Oh, intended to note the “view with alarm” hand waving. *feh* A tactic of those losing arguments. *yawn* Oh, and the crickets are still chirping their answer to my initial question to you: What fallacies? Can you identify one fallacy in my original post? Can you even identify the class of fallacy or even what kind of aregumentation my post is an example of? The crickets are still chirping their answer to my initial question challenging your assertion that “The numbers of logical fallacies committed in this post are alarming” nf I suspect that is your answer: stone silence. Classy, Brett. Throw the rock and run away.]
Building on that false accusation (that I asserted we are not rational beings–a question that is still open to honest debate) you make the arrogant comment,
“But I will submit to your great and expanding intellect and accept that you are clearly not a rational being and move along my humble way.”
Now, given your apparent disingenuity (or inability to understand plain English), combined with such a deceitfully arrogant “throw the rock and run away” comment, I suppose I can only respond with the profundity of Monty Python,
“Your mother was a hamster and your father smelt of elderberries! Now, go away or I shall taunt you a second time-a.”Well, I suppose not, after all… But that’s very close to what I believe an appropriate response might well be to your latest comment. 🙂
Oh, addendum…
You offer: “It is also clear that you have no grasp of irony, as my original comments where [sic] meant to merely reflect the tone and structure of your post.”
“[W]here meant”?!? Come on, Brett. I’m sure I’d have been able to see the intentional irony (althopugh I did point out the very ironic ignorantia elenchi of your central claim) were not your use of English so execrably halt and lame–e.g. “where meant” et al. I’ve noted only a few of your malapropisms, strange syntax errors, etc. The fact that you simply and plainly appear–either genuinely or disingenuously–to completely misunderstand plain English added to your awkward use of the language effectively disguised any tardily claimed intentional irony. The apparently unintentional irony of your prose shouted down any faint hints of ironic intent.
Besides, were you to have intended an ironic reflection of ” the tone and structure of [my] post” you’d have had to at least eliminated a few of the malapropisms in your comment, find something that approximated my posts “voice” and injected something that looked in some way, shape, fashion or form as intentional irony instead of the unintentional irony of not even recognizing the fallacies inherent in your statement about my supposed illogical lapses.
None of those elements were present in your initial comment, and indeed, you have demonstrated a lack of understanding of the central issue you made argument with me about. You’ve not really read any of the pragmatists in primary texts, have you, Brett? I sincerely doubt you’ve actually read much–if any–of Kierkegaard’s work, either. Took a sophomore survey course, didn’t you? At least, that’s what your comments appear from here to reflect. (Oh *slaps forehead!*, that’s right. My bad. Sophomore survey courses are now graduate level fare. *feh* Confession: although I enjoyed Kirekegaard’s work in grad school–had no reason to read him earlier–and even quoted him in my wedding vows, I didn’t really appreciate him until a reintroduction a few years later by Per Lønning. But that’s one of those stories best kept in the family.)