Just CLICK for Infamous Monsters of Filmland. See if you can tell which is which…
“Waiting for Godot”
Here’s a pic of some sKerry supporters “Waiting for Godot”
Note: “Waiting for Godot” is Samuel Beckett’s existential “theater of the absurd” play (that is, no drama, chronological plot, etc.) . In the play, the main characters mostly just sit around waiting for something—anything! Godot!!— to relieve their boredom.
Can’t you just sense the electricity in the air “Waiting for sKerry”?
“Waiting for Godot”
Here’s a pic of some sKerry supporters “Waiting for Godot”
Note: “Waiting for Godot” is Samuel Beckett’s existential “theater of the absurd” play (that is, no drama, chronological plot, etc.) . In the play, the main characters mostly just sit around waiting for something—anything! Godot!!— to relieve their boredom.
Can’t you just sense the electricity in the air “Waiting for sKerry”?
Misunderstanding the Iraq war, part 2
This much we pledge—and more.” –John F. Kennedy
“So in war, through the influence of an infinity of petty circumstances, which cannot properly be described on paper, things disappoint us, and we fall short of the mark. A powerful iron will overcomes this friction, it crushes the obstacles…” –Clausewitz, on “friction” in war.
Misunderstanding the Iraq war, part 2
This much we pledge—and more.” –John F. Kennedy
“So in war, through the influence of an infinity of petty circumstances, which cannot properly be described on paper, things disappoint us, and we fall short of the mark. A powerful iron will overcomes this friction, it crushes the obstacles…” –Clausewitz, on “friction” in war.
Misunderstanding the Iraq War
There are many ways in which the Mass Media Podpeople’s Army (otherwise known as ABCCBSNBCCNNWaPoNYT, etc.)
has contributed to a misunderstanding of the Iraq War, but two things typical Mass Media Podpeople seem genetically unable to comprehend stand out.
(Of course, friction can also refer to difficulties of terrain, weather, logistics, etc., that are met as uncontrollable circumstances change.)
On a slightly different subject, here’s an article by someone who’s not a military professional considering the “fog of war”.
By MICHAEL S. MALONE
“This work is the opinion of the columnist and in no way reflects the opinion of ABC News.”
No duh.
Clausewitz, again, this time on the “fog of war”:
“All action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which like a fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”
Now, while Clausewitz did not specifically use “fog of war” in any of his writings, the description given above fits the modern use of the term: that which is unknown is always larger than that which is known, and the unknown always distorts our understanding of what is known in ways we cannot anticipate.
That is one of the reasons why a general staff works better than a micro-managing Alexander or Lee in modern war. Setting goals and giving the boots on the ground latitude in achieving the goals is simply more realistic than directing minutiae from afar, given the complexity of the tasks of war. And the friction and fog of war demand that modern soldiers be trusted to operate with flexibility, to the best of their abilities—and make human mistakes!—within the minimally controlled chaos that is war.
And so, to Iraq.
I’m not going to argue the “wrong war, wrong place, wrong time” aspect. Hindsight applied to fixing blame (for purposes of personal gain) is only good for people who are going backwards. No. We are there. And if, in looking back, we see mistakes made by the boots on the ground, we see also phenomenal successes. In spite of the inevitable friction of war, a large majority of Iraqis are much better off in terms of safety and freedom than before the war. About 400,000 tons (of the 1,000,000 tons of munitions Saddam purchased from France, Germany, Russia) have been destroyed and more is under Coalition control and even more being discovered regularly. The Kurdish north is probably safer than downtown Detroit.
And much of this is due to a President who knew he was not competent, who knew NO ONE is competent, to micro-manage the boots on the ground. Did President Bush make some mistakes in setting strategy and in making appointments to implement the strategies that were set? I believe so. But even given that (and that I would rather the U.S. have spent the $$ that were spent on this war on other things), is there evidence that Islamic jihadists have been severely damaged by this war and that the U.S. is safer because of it? Yes, there is. We are safer in the most important metric: not the number of terrorists convicted of crimes but the number of terrorists killed. Every dead jihadist taken out by a Marine sniper or killed by a well-targeted air strike is one less Islamic jihadist planning or executing a terrorist strike on our soil.
Misunderstanding the Iraq War
There are many ways in which the Mass Media Podpeople’s Army (otherwise known as ABCCBSNBCCNNWaPoNYT, etc.)
has contributed to a misunderstanding of the Iraq War, but two things typical Mass Media Podpeople seem genetically unable to comprehend stand out.
(Of course, friction can also refer to difficulties of terrain, weather, logistics, etc., that are met as uncontrollable circumstances change.)
On a slightly different subject, here’s an article by someone who’s not a military professional considering the “fog of war”.
By MICHAEL S. MALONE
“This work is the opinion of the columnist and in no way reflects the opinion of ABC News.”
No duh.
Clausewitz, again, this time on the “fog of war”:
“All action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which like a fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”
Now, while Clausewitz did not specifically use “fog of war” in any of his writings, the description given above fits the modern use of the term: that which is unknown is always larger than that which is known, and the unknown always distorts our understanding of what is known in ways we cannot anticipate.
That is one of the reasons why a general staff works better than a micro-managing Alexander or Lee in modern war. Setting goals and giving the boots on the ground latitude in achieving the goals is simply more realistic than directing minutiae from afar, given the complexity of the tasks of war. And the friction and fog of war demand that modern soldiers be trusted to operate with flexibility, to the best of their abilities—and make human mistakes!—within the minimally controlled chaos that is war.
And so, to Iraq.
I’m not going to argue the “wrong war, wrong place, wrong time” aspect. Hindsight applied to fixing blame (for purposes of personal gain) is only good for people who are going backwards. No. We are there. And if, in looking back, we see mistakes made by the boots on the ground, we see also phenomenal successes. In spite of the inevitable friction of war, a large majority of Iraqis are much better off in terms of safety and freedom than before the war. About 400,000 tons (of the 1,000,000 tons of munitions Saddam purchased from France, Germany, Russia) have been destroyed and more is under Coalition control and even more being discovered regularly. The Kurdish north is probably safer than downtown Detroit.
And much of this is due to a President who knew he was not competent, who knew NO ONE is competent, to micro-manage the boots on the ground. Did President Bush make some mistakes in setting strategy and in making appointments to implement the strategies that were set? I believe so. But even given that (and that I would rather the U.S. have spent the $$ that were spent on this war on other things), is there evidence that Islamic jihadists have been severely damaged by this war and that the U.S. is safer because of it? Yes, there is. We are safer in the most important metric: not the number of terrorists convicted of crimes but the number of terrorists killed. Every dead jihadist taken out by a Marine sniper or killed by a well-targeted air strike is one less Islamic jihadist planning or executing a terrorist strike on our soil.
Whatever It Takes
Whatever It Takes
“New Math” at CBSNYT
Let’s see… before the war, only 3 tons of one of the explosives in question and none of the explosives were secured… CBS/NYT thinks 3 tons=141 tons (that’s New Math for ya)… oh, and let’s not forget the Russians were in the area trucking stuff out before the shooting started… see here and here.